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Introduction 
There is an extensive and well-known literature that examines relationships between the 
economic, environmental, political and social dimensions of sustainability and the potential 
synergies, conflicts and trade-offs among these. Understanding these poses both theoretical 
and practical challenges.There undoubtedly are hard choices to be made as to priorities and 
differing views as to the compatibility of objectives relating to these four dimensions. In 
particular, there is continuing disagreement as the extent to which and ways in which an 
economy driven by the imperatives of capital can or can not be made compatible with the 
pursuit of environmental and social sustainability. By and large, however, the discussion is 
limited to a conceptualisation of the economy that is composed of  formally regulated and 
legally sanctioned activities. This is at best a partial conceptualisation, however, as a 
significant proportion of activity in the global capitalist economy is in one way or another 
illegal. Recognition of this raises important questions both as to the relationship between 
the legal and illegal and – the focus of this Chapter – the implications of the prominence of 
the illegal for the sustainability of the economy itself and for the successful pursuit of other 
dimensions of sustainability. 
At one level, the definition of the illegal seems straightforward. Illegal economic activity can 
be defined as “[t]hose productive activities that generate goods and services forbidden by 
law or that are unlawful when carried out by unauthorised producers”  (OECD, 2002, 13).  As 
this definition makes clear, however, the legal and illegal are relationally defined, with the 
line between them varying among different territorial jurisdictions at different spatial scales, 
most commonly the scale of the national state, and over time. Bearing this definitional 
qualification in mind, authorities such as the IMF and World Bank estimate that the illegal 
economy accounts for perhaps 20% of global GDP and considerably more in particular 
territories and jurisdictions (for example, 40-50% or more in (so-called) transitional 
economies and developing economies: Glenny, 2008). However, illegal activities are by 
means confined to these parts of the world. They are also present in a range of spaces in the 
core capitalist economies of the developed world – ranging from pivotal financial districts in 
major metropolitan city-regions to diverse deindustrialised and marginalised places. In 
short, the illegal is rife and permeates the space-economy of contemporary capitalism and 
cuts across and problematises binaries such as core/periphery, developed/underdeveloped 
Chapter for Redclift and Springett edited collection 
 
3 
 
and North/South. The questions posed and to be explored in this chapter are, on the one 
hand, to what extent do illegal activities undermine the sustainability of the contemporary 
global economy, and on the other hand and perhaps seemingly counter-intuitively, to what 
extent are illegal activities integral to the economic sustainability of the global economy? 
Linked to these is a number of questions as to the relationships between economic, 
environmental, social and political sustainability for while illegality may help sustain the 
global economy it may at the same time contribute to the erosion of the environmental (via 
illegal production and dumping of polluting wastes, for example) , political (via challenging 
the legitimacy of national states, for example) and social (as a result of the effects of illegal 
labour migration and employment of child labour , for example) dimensions of 
sustainability. While the main focus of the Chapter is upon the relationships between 
illegality and the economic sustainability of the global economy, these other aspects of 
sustainability will be touched upon where they are affected by the presence of illegal 
economic activities .  
The extent of illegality suggests that understandings of the capital accumulation process and 
the sustainability of the economy that rely solely upon published statistics relating to the 
formal legal economy are, at best, partial  both in terms of the relative weight of broad 
sectors of activity and also the dynamics of individual companies within them. There is an 
obvious difficulty in estimating the magnitude and effects of illegal activity and its 
articulations with the legal precisely because it is beyond the gaze of national states and 
other bodies that regulate the legal economy and generate the data that describe it 
(although that is not to say without their connivance on occasion).  However, I agree with 
Castells (2010, 173) that difficulties in obtaining precise empirical data on the extent of 
illegality should not stand in the way of seeking to understand its function and practices and 
the relations between the legal and illegal. While always present within capitalist 
economies, the illegal has clearly expanded to become an integral part of the contemporary 
phase of capitalist development, given greater prominence because of the tendency to neo-
liberalisation, giving greater freedom to lightly regulated markets , enabled by revolutionary 
advances in ICTs. Illegal practices are present in routine production in factories and 
workplaces, in the widespread theft of intellectual property (IP) and the growth of 
counterfeit ‘knock offs’ and forgeries , in a variety of exchange and trading activities (flows of 
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people, arms, cigarettes, and drugs for example) and crucially in flows of money and money 
laundering activities in centres of global finance that convert massive sums of money 
generated in illegal activities into legitimate money capital in the formal mainstream 
economy.  
While there is a definitional difficulty, then, it is clear that illegal activities typically  form a 
substantial part of total economic activity, a big enough part for them to be considered as 
an integral part of the normal workings of the capitalist economy rather than a marginal 
anomaly (Brown and Cloke, 2007; Murphy, 2011). However, the spatial and temporal 
variation in the significance of the illegal and in the coupling of illegal and legal suggests that 
while each depends upon the other, the relationship between them is contingent as well as 
symbiotic. As a result, the significance of the illegal to economic sustainability  - and so its 
effects upon environmental, political and social sustainability – varies over both space and 
time. 
Clearly, then, how, when and where legal and illegal activities intersect in the circuits of 
capital and spaces of capitalist economic activity is a critical issue (Castells, 2010; 
Nordstrom, 2007). There are also important questions as to how illegal activities are 
governed and regulated in different spaces and times and how their modes of regulation 
relate to those of the mainstream legal economy. This is particularly so as there is a tension 
integral to capitalism, inherent in the primacy of the profit motive, between the need for 
competing companies to operate according to the ‘rules of the game’, and the pressure to 
bend those rules (Murphy, 2011, 135).  The same point can to an extent be made about 
national states in their competiton for economic activity and investment. The primacy of 
competition and the profit motive results in  a tendency for the boundary between the legal 
and the illegal to be blurred, if not outright transgressed, and for such blurring to be 
structurally embedded in the day-to-day operations and practices of capitalist economies. 
How, where and to what extent such blurring occurs, however, varies between times and 
spaces. Nevertheless the links between the legal and illegal are critical to the dynamic, 
trajectory, spatiality and sustainability of accumulation globally. 
In the remainder of this chapter, and recognising the prevalence of the illegal across the 
global economy and its centrality in a variety of forms of production and flows of people and 
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things, I will explore the scope of the illegal and its links to the legal in a preliminary way via 
two main sets of activities. First, the presence of illegal working practices and other 
violations of the legal frameworks within which production, exchange and trade are carried 
out in particular spaces. This will also involve some consideration of illegal flows of labour. 
Secondly, the extent to which the legal permeates the practices that make possible flows of 
money within the illegal economy and, crucially, from the illegal into the legal mainstream. 
While the first issue is critical to the success or otherwise of competing companies it also 
poses risks to environmental, political and social sustainability; the second is critical to the 
sustainability of sovereign states and beyond that to the systemic sustainability of the 
contemporary form of globalising capitalism. 
New forms of corporate organisation and the further growth of illegal 
working practices in the globalising economy 
Since the initial discovery of the New International Division of Labour (Fröbel et al, 1980) 
there has been a keen interest in the relationships between new forms of corporate 
organisation and new ways of capital using spatial difference in pursuit of profit, one 
consequence of which has been growing inequalities in economic well-being and 
performance at scales ranging from the global to the local (Hudson, 2001). This enhanced 
interest in spatial differences has been one consequence of the growing emphasis on the 
activities of MNCs and their transition to becoming managers of brands and brand families 
while seeking to out-source material commodity production to the cheapest feasible 
location (Hudson, 2005, 63-75). For the significance of brands, typically tied to specific 
proprietary markers, such as hieroglyphs, logos or individuals, which define both the brand 
and particular brand families (Klein, 2000) is that they enable their corporate owners to reap 
surplus profits. The focus on brand management is linked to an emphasis on product 
differentiation, high level R&D, advertising, marketing and PR, on the upper echelons of the 
value chain.  Companies retain these activities in their core spaces while out-sourcing and 
increasingly off-shoring routine production of components and assembly work and 
increasingly some aspects of back office work and routine R&D to form complex globally 
distributed production sysems and thereby reduce production costs. There has been an 
increasing recognition of this in analyses of Global Production Networks (GPNs), global value 
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chains and global commodity chains and the ways in which the production of commodities 
involves complex links and flows of materials and value between a diverse range of spaces 
in different parts of the world (Hudson, 2008).  
Illegality, migration and labour markets 
What has not been considered in any systematic way, however, is the centrality of illegal 
working practices in the emergence and economic sustainability of such global chains and 
networks and their implications for other dimensions of sustainability. Increasingly within 
these various forms of global production systems much routine production work is re-
located not simply to spaces in which labour and other production costs are lower but to 
spaces in which they can be further lowered by the widespread use of illegal working 
practices. Illegality lies at the heart of the production process. There is, for example, 
compelling evidence of this in China, Indonesia , India, Burma and other parts of south east 
Asia as well as parts of central and eastern Europe, across a wide range of industries 
including clothing and textiles and consumer electronics (mobile phones, PCs and their 
various components and offshoots such as tablets) in the new ‘workshops of the world’ of 
21st century capitalism. In their journey through global chains and networks many 
commodities may therefore routinely involve legal and illegal activities and pass through 
both legally and illegally regulated spaces.  
As a consequence in many parts of the world the organisation of production and more 
specifically the moment of production itself in which surplus-value is produced and which is 
central to any form of capitalist production is now critically dependent upon some 
combination of legal and illegal labour and working practices. Illegal labour can be provided 
by members of an indigenous population, for example via child labour or indentured labour 
and there is widespread evidence of this.  However, the supply of illegal labour is also linked 
to flows of migrant workers and this has increased in significance as processes of 
globalisation have widened and deepened.  
Illegal labour that is not legally purchased on formally regulated labour markets may then 
be deployed as labour-power in activities that are legal, although those illegal migrants who 
perform such work are not authorised to do so. This has profound implications for both 
capital and labout.For capital it enables the costs of production to be driven down further. 
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For those who provide labour-power, it has serious implications for the precariouness of 
their position in the labour market, level of wages, and working and living conditions as 
labour market inequality and social inequality more generally widen as a result.  
Labour-power provided via migrant workers can have a doubly downward effect on 
production costs. Since labour is always produced as a fictive commodity and indeed has to 
be in order that commodified labour-power can come into existence  (Elson, 1979), the price 
that capital has to pay to secure labour-power reflects the conditions under which labour is 
reproduced, and the distribution of the costs of that reproduction (as between family, 
community, and state) over time and space. As a result, migrant labour can reduce 
production costs in three ways. Firstly, within legal systems of both intra-national (notably 
China in recent years) and international (for example from the Mediterranean region to 
northern Europe) migrant labour flows, because the costs of reproduction of such labour 
have been displaced elsewhere in time/space. Secondly, and in addition, because illegal 
migrant labour by definition lacks citizenship and legal rights, it is particularly vulnerable to 
further hyper-exploitation and in this way can lead to a further lowering of production costs . 
Furthermore, thirdly, such labour can displace indigenous labour and so expand labour 
reserves, further pushing down wages and the value of labour-power and enhancing rates 
of exploitation, profit and accumulation more generally. National states may on occasion 
turn a blind eye to such illegal migration in order to intensify labour market competition as 
one strand of broader neoliberal strategies (Evans et al, 2006, 61).  
In some cases, workers who were initially legal migrants lose their jobs and so become 
illegal migrants as their work permits expire. Often, in these circumstances, they are unable 
to return to their country of origin because of indebtedness incurred through the payment 
of fees to agents in order to become migrants in the first place. As a result, they become 
vulnerable to recruitment as illegal labour with a very precarious existence.  In other cases, 
especially involving agency contract workers, agencies deliberately arrange for people to 
become illegal immigrants in order that they can be employed on inferior conditions and 
lower wages (SOMO, 2009). 
Illegal practices in the circuit of productive capital: mining, manufacturing and trade 
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Manufacturing involves processes of both value creation and material transformation. The 
starting point for the manufacturing process and the creation of socially useful and valued 
commodities under capitalist relations of production is therefore the transformation of 
elements of the natural world. An important strand of this initial stage in the production 
process involves winning minerals via mining them from the earth. Many critical minerals 
are found in parts of the world conventionally regarded as underdeveloped, such as Africa 
and parts of Asia and south America. In these locations political elites often continue to look 
favourably on investment in mining by MNCs as, allegedly, a post-colonial route to 
development. While much mining activity is legal, there are also numerous instances of 
illegal mining of minerals such as copper, palladium, platinum and tin involving 
unauthorised workers including children or indentured labour and/or workers working 
under conditions that otherwise violate labour laws (for example, see Action Against 
Impunity for Human Rights, 2011; Erman, 2007; Nordbrand and Bolme, 2007; Pöyhönen and 
Simola, 2007). Such minerals then enter complex patterns of international trade and the 
supply chains of major multinationals that use them as inputs to their production processes. 
The pathways through which such minerals make their way to legal manufacturing locations 
are often opaque. The effect of such flows is to cut production costs for companies using 
these materials and components made from them, enabling them to undercut competitors, 
enhance market share and profitability and so their sustainability as competitive capital. 
However, at the same time illegal mining activities can undermine both ecological and social 
sustainability as a direct result of mining, and because of toxic wastes that are dumped 
untreated into the environment with deleterious effects upon both environmental and 
human health and well-being.  There are clear tensions between various dimensions of 
sustainability and the interests,  influence and asymmetrical power of different classes is 
decisive in determining how these are managed and resolved, in determining who benefits 
from and who bears the costs of such activities . 
Illegality is far from being confined to mining and other activities involving material 
transformations at the start of the production process and then onwards through 
manufacturing, however. Morever, it takes a variety of diferent forms. For example, it also 
involves the widespread theft of intellectual property (IP) and related activities throughout 
manufacturing in many parts of the world in a range of industries producing manufactured 
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goods for mainstream legal markets:  “today nearly every consumer and industrial product 
is subject to counterfeiting” (OECD, 2007, cited in Chaudhry and Zimmerman, 2010, 26).  
Counterfeit goods account for about 7% of global trade, with two thirds of these originating 
in China alone (Glenny, 2008; Phillips, 2005). Russia and some other south Asian and Latin 
American countries are also major sources of counterfeit production (Chaudhry and 
Zimmerman, 2010). As well as ‘knock offs‘ and counterfeit goods, i llegal production can 
involve theft of IP and illegal copies of branded goods, in both cases goods that may be 
produced by workers who are legitimate and legal (Phillips, 2005). However, they may also 
be produced by illegal workers, resulting in “good copies” (Saviano, 2008) being produced at 
very low labour cost..  
Furthermore, labour-power that is legally purchased on the labour market – that is, from 
workers whose status is legal as opposed to those who are illegal - can be illegally employed 
because of the structural weakness of labour in particular spaces of production. For example 
companies may withhold wages and force workers to work beyond the legal limit for 
overtime, violating both national legislation and international agreements such as the ILO’s 
Hours of Work Convention and execerabting labour market inequality as a result. In 
addition, workers may be forced to work in conditions that violate environmental, labour 
and health and safety legislation and in illegal production  processes that lead to 
environmental pollution via the illegal dumping of (often toxic) wastes  (Hudson, 2010). 
Often workers have little choice but to work excessive and illegal overtime because their 
legal basic wage is below the level of a ‘living wage’ or because they are forced to work 
‘voluntary’ unpaid overtime on pain of the threat of dismissal or other sanctions if they 
refuse to do so (Nordbrand and de Haan, 2009). Consequently, the boundaries between 
legal and illegal in production are frequently fuzzy and unclear. Furthermore, illegally 
produced goods may be packed and distributed by legal businesses, further blurring the 
boundary between legal and illegal.  
 
There is a long history of smuggling across national borders and this continues, as places 
such as Ciudad del Este on the Paraguayan-Brazilian- Argentinian border (the “Triple 
Frontier”) clearly reveal (for example, see Naím, 2007; Neuwirth, 2012). More significantly, 
however, the tremendous growth in containerised transport on a global scale has both 
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added to the problems of environmental sustainability and also complicated the process of 
identifying illegally produced goods as these can be mixed in with legally produced goods . 
The United Nations (2008)  estimated  that 420 million containers are shipped around the 
world every year, virtually uninspected (United Nations, 2008). Such is the scale of 
movement of containers through the major ports that form the key nodal points in global 
transport networks that it is impossible for customs officials to check more than a small 
sample of containers entering and leaving a port. In part this reflects the volume of 
containers, in part the low priority attached to checking them. For example, in 1992 only 
five Dutch customs agents were allocated systematically to examine the cargo manifests of 
the 32,000 ships docking in Rotterdam each year so that they were only checking an average 
of six of the the 6,000 containers off-loaded each day (Sterling, 1994, 247). As a result, as 
Nordstrom put it (2007, xvi): “As I sit watching the 446 cargo ships enter and leave the 
mega-port of Rotterdam a day, I know I am watching somewhere between 200 and 446 
ships breaking the law in some way. By most estimates I have received in these five years, it 
is more along the lines of 446”. By 2010 almost 8,500,000 containers passed through the 
port of Antwerp, with customs officials unable to screen even 2.0% of all declared goods, 
using scanners and other devices. There were only 8 customs officials working on drugs 
issues, compared to 100 in the port of Hamburg. As a result, there is no information as to 
the precise amount of illegal goods smuggled through Antwerp, but it is undoubtedly a 
significant amount, contained in perhaps 1,000 containers a year (Clerix, 2011). There is no 
doubt that drugs, principally cocaine from south America (Colombia, Ecuador,Panama, 
Peru), continue to be  smuggled through Antwerp in significant amounts, concealed in 
containers among legitimate cargo, usually hidden in fake fruit (such as bananas and 
pineapples) or among cargoes of timber.  
 
Moreover, smuggled drugs are being removed from the port of Antwerp in increasingly 
novel and sophisticated ways.  Criminal drugs gangs have hired specialist criminal hackers to 
hack into the terminal operating IT systems. The hackers then broke into the shipping 
company offices, attaching tracking devices to computer terminals , which allowed them to 
remotely monitor everything typed on the computer’s key board and access passwords and 
screengrabs, or installed malware to gain access to information on their hard disks. This 
enabled the drug smugglers to identify the specific containers containing drugs, send in their 
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own lorry drivers, load the identified containers onto their lorries and remove the 
containers from the port before their legitimate owners, blissfully unaware of what was 
happening,  could do so. This was a clear indication that the smuggling activities had 
reached new levels of organisational and technological sophistication, as groups of criminals 
from the worlds of drugs and IT came together in project teams to retrieve specific 
containers (Global Post, 2012; Freeman, 2013). It seems unlikely that such developments 
are limited to Antwerp. 
. 
Iillegal employment practices in production, such as those described above, are often 
facilitated by the absence of trades unions (for example in “no union no strike” Export 
Production Zones) or the presence of unions that are effectively under state control and/or 
the influence of employers. Such practices are also widespread over much of south east Asia 
and in Central and Eastern Europe, both in sectors such as consumer electronics and IT that 
are commonly represented as “high tech” and “clean” production (for example, see Chan et 
al, 2008;  Mackay, 2004; Pöyhönen  and Wan, 2011;) as well as industries commonly seen ‘ 
traditional’ and labour-intensive in their production methods, such as brick making or 
clothing production (for example, see Oonk et al, 2012; Upadhyaya, 2008).  Commodities 
produced under these circumstances can then compete with and undercut legitimately 
produced commodities, reducing the market share and profits of those producers operating 
legally and conforming to the requirements of labour legislation.  Commodities produced by 
illegal workers enable those companies that employ them (whether directly or indirectly, 
knowingly or unknowingly) to undercut those produced by companies employing labour 
employed legally – with implications for the conditions of those so employed, for uneven 
development among companies and spaces and also for systemic sustainability.  
The re-location of  routine production work within global production systems to spaces in 
which labour and other production costs can be further lowered through illegal working 
practices, both via the intensification of work and the systematic extension of working time 
beyond legal maxima, therefore increases the production of absolute surplus-value. The net 
result is to increase the profitability of production, especially for those major MNCs that are 
the brand managers at the head of the value chain that control the production systems.  
While major MNCs have often put in place Corporate Social Responsibility policies that 
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prescribe working conditions and practices, under pressure from NGOS and consumers in 
the countries that are the predominant markets for products produced in this way, these 
rarely extend beyond first-tier suppliers. Moreover, these policies are routinely breached. 
This is because they conflict with competitive pressures to cut costs and lead to managers 
deliberately falsifying employment records to disguise illegal overtime and underpayment of 
wages (Sum and Ngai, 2005). 
At the same time, however, the switch of much routine production away from ‘traditional’ 
industrial cities and regions in core countries has created spaces in which other forms of 
illegality have emerged, in part as people there seek to construct survival strategies in 
spaces that have become marginal to, or expelled from, mainstream circuits of capital . As 
employment in the mainstream legal economy has shrunk dramatically such spaces form 
fertile ground in which a range of illegal trading activities – not least those focussed on 
drugs – as well as iillicit and/or illegal production activities, often involving il legal migrant 
workers, have taken  root and expanded (Evans et al, 2006).  Sometimes this growth has 
been symbiotically linked to the growth of an incarcerated prison population (Peck and 
Theodore, 2008). Often such activities result in the erosion of  environmental as well as 
social sustainability because of the illegal dumping of wastes and pollutants (Saviano, 2008).  
The net result of these interrelated changes to the economy and labour market is that the 
economic and employment structures of these spaces in core countries have come to 
resemble those thought typical of the booming cities of peripheral countries in Africa, Asia 
and central and south America (for example, see Portes et al, 1989), with adverse effects on 
other dimensions of sustainability. 
Illegality and the ‘blind eyes’ of the state 
It is clear that the proliferation of illegal activities in many parts of the world, especially 
those on the margins, often involves the entanglement of elements of the legal state and its 
officials in illegal activities (flows of labour, trade, and the production of goods) either 
directly or by indirectly sanctioning them by turning a ‘blind eye’ (in return for a financial 
consideration) to their existence ( for example, see Castells, 2010; Glenny, 2008; Hill, 2005; 
Pöyhönen and Simola, 2007; Saviano, 2008).  Alternatively, state officials may turn a ‘blind 
eye’ to illegal practices because of a desire to encourage economic growth in their area (for 
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example, see CIVIDEP, 2009; Kynge, 2006; 2009). This selective blindness extends from the 
start to the finish of the production system. It is axiomatic that unless commodities can be 
sold, the surplus-value that they embody remains unrealised. Consequently, in addition to 
the wide range of legally sanctioned spaces and associated practices of sale for commodities 
(see Hudson, 2005, 145-166), there are also specific spaces in marginalised locations as well 
as iconic and well-known street markets in major global cities such as Beijing, London, Los 
Angeles, New York and Paris in which illegally produced commodities are sold (Chaudhry 
and Zimmerman, 2010, 42-43).  Such markets,  which state regulators regard with ’blind 
eyes‘, effectively legitimate the illegal activities involved in the prior production of the 
commodities on sale there. In so doing, they enable producers to realise the surplus-value 
embodied in those commodities and consumers to acquire the symbolic value and prestige 
of premium brands at a fraction of the price of the genuine article, undercutting the latter in 
the market while to all intents and purposes appearing to be the genuine article. One 
consequence of systematically turning a blind eye to illegal activities, however, is a loss – 
often considerable – of revenue to the state that could be used for progressive 
developmental purposes and indeed to promote more sustainable forms of economic 
activity and practice. From another – and potentially more progressive – perspective, 
however, insofar as the reproduction of uneven development creates spaces in which 
challenges emerge to the existing capitalist order, it potentially threatens its sustainability.  
Whether and how such potential is realised is  of course a different matter. 
Challenging illegality in globalising circuits of productive capital? 
In conclusion, from the perspective of capital the reason for the expansion and widespread 
presence of illegal working practices is crystal clear: the imperative to make a higher mass 
and/or rate of profit than one’s competitors. This is a very visible manifestation of the 
competitive pressures that are genetically encoded into capitalist relations of production.  In 
this sense, illegality is critical to the success of individual competing companies and to the 
short-term sustainability of contemporary capitalist arrangements. However as Polanyi 
(1944) noted some time ago, deepening capitalist social relations and market disciplines, 
challenging existing cultural norms and accepted forms of social behaviour, characteristically 
trigger a response that contests the direction of change. Consequently, economic 
development is characterised by a ‘double movement’, a tension between social forces 
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pushing for increased marketization and those opposing them. There is evidence of growing 
resistance to the flouting of environmental legislation and the consequent erosion of 
environmental sustainability and to working practices that are seen as immoral as well as 
illegal and so to the longer–term political and social sustainability of forms of production 
that are dependent on the hyper-exploitation of labour.   
 
Illegal flows of money, spaces of sanitisation and disguise: the heightened 
significance of the illegal in globalising capitalism 
 As the passing references above to illegal movements of people and things imply, illegal 
working practices in spaces and systems of production are simply one facet of the much 
more general occurrence of the illegal in the contemporary economy of spaces and flows. 
There is extensive evidence of illegal flows of people, of commodities (some legal, others 
illegal, such as drugs) and money, especially the laundering of money from the illegal 
economy back into the mainstream legal economy as ‘clean’ money capital.  This last activity 
is of particular significance in the context of the systemic sustainability of contemporary 
economic arrangements and the relationships between the flows of illegally produced 
commodities, illegal migrants and illegal flows of money are complex and, by design, 
opaque. That said,  these monetary flows are the focus of this section and just as national 
states and regulatory organisations are implicated in illegal activities of production and 
trade, so too are they deeply implicated in facilitating flows of money from the illegal to 
legal economy. 
As Castells (2010, 183) points out, emphasising the symbiotic links between illegal activities 
and the overall accumulation process , “[t]he whole criminal system only makes sense if the 
profits generated can be used and reinvested in the legal economy”. Some money realised 
through illegal activities undoubtedly remains within circuits of illegal activity, in part 
financing activities that compete with those that are legally based. However, it is estimated 
that at least two thirds of the money earned in the illegal economy is immediately spent in 
the legal economy (Schneider and Enster, 2000). While the precise magnitude may be a 
matter for debate, the existence of the flow and the fact that it is significant is not. Some of 
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this money is used to support livelihoods and enables increased commodity consumption. A 
much greater proportion becomes money capital, however, invested in diverse legitimate 
activities and spaces in mainstream markets. This both enhances the competitive position of 
those who own it and contributes systemically to the expanded reproduction of capital and 
to the sectoral and spatial distribution of growth. Furthermore, the flows of money from 
illegal activities that become invested in the legal mainstream raise the question of the 
spaces in which illegally acquired profits become ‘clean’ money.   
This cleansing principally occurs in a particular type of space - offshore tax havens (OTHs), 
though by no means exclusively so there.  For example, in 1997 the 55 banks in the 
Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este, located wheíre its border meets those of Argentina and 
Brazil at the “Triple Frontier”, laundered an estimated $45 billion o generated mainly from 
cocaine revenues from the Andean countries (Naím, 2007, 142-3). OTHs are legal 
jurisdictions created as a result of collusion between national states and major capitalist 
interests, “secrecy spaces” (Christensen and Hampton, 1999) that provide an interface 
between legal and illegal economies. OTHs were originally established as spaces in which 
perfectly legal (though perhaps ethically and morally dubious) activities of tax avoidance 
were permissible. Subsequently they have become the sites of a majority of many of the 
financial transactions of the global economy: over 50% of international bank lending, 
approximately 33% of foreign direct investment and 50% of global trade is routed on paper 
via tax havens which account for only 3% of world GDP (Christensen, 2011, 178). The 
expansion of OTHs has been enabled by developments in ICTs and closely linked to the 
liberalisation of global capital markets and the growing dominance of processes of 
neoliberalisation (Sikka, 2003). As a result, however, “legal institutions granted special 
status and privilege by society have been subverted to purposes for which they were never 
intended” (Christensen, 2011, 183).  
Most OTHs are closely linked to major OECD economies. About half are linked to the UK, 
either as Overseas Territories, Crown Dependencies or members of the Commonwealth. 
Moreover, many OTHs are not literally “offshore” as the term is strictly a political statement 
about the relationship between the state and parts of its related territories (Palan, 1999). 
Indeed, such spaces have been created at the heart of the globalising economy in cities such 
as London and New York, with differential regulatory regimes that share one aspect in 
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common: they differentiate regulatory standards as between domestic resident capital and 
non-resident international capital (Unger and Rawlings, 2008). As the spate of press reports 
in 2012 emphasised, major banks such as Barclays, HSBC and Standard Charter may well 
have been routinely involved in money laundering through their bases in London, New York 
and so on. As Castells (2012, xx1, emphasis added) notes, “[w]orldwide, money laundering 
networks have taken advantage of a giant market of financial derivatives and loosely 
regulated institutions, including institutions located in main financial centres”.  
 
Advanced capitalist states (such as Switzerland,  the UK and USA) frequently collude in 
preventing the development of effective international regulation to tackle illegal financial 
flows and police cross-border financial flows in and out of the OTHs, precisely because they 
play a pivotal role in the global accumulation process and the ‘new international order of 
disorder’ that this generates. These powerful national states and the international 
institutions that they dominate, notably the World Bank and IMF, and the interests 
represented and prioritised through them, have been instrumental in constructing the crisis 
generating invisible architecture of globalisation as well as its more publicly visible 
institutional forms. Far from this architecture being a deus ex machina imposed from above 
on hapless and helpless national states, powerful national states were and are integrally 
involved in its construction - although of course it was then imposed on other hapless 
weaker and peripheral states at considerable cost to the majority of their populations.  
 
As a result, OTHs have been central to the emergence of neoliberal globalisation and the 
opaque practices that spawned the innovative financial products such as complex 
derivatives that lay at the heart of the global financial crisis that exploded in 2008 (Kaletsky, 
2010; Patterson, 2010). Because OTHs are permissive spaces, they allow – indeed encourage 
- transactions and flows that elsewhere would be deemed illegal and so enable profits 
generated in the illegal economy to be sanitised and recycled into the circuits of the legal. 
Elaborate schemes are devised to “weave dirty money” (Christensen, 2011, 183) into 
commercial transactions and disguise the proceeds of crime and tax evasion using complex 
multi-jurisdictional structures that exploit the asymmetries among regulatory spaces. 
Precisely because they involve activities on the fringes of or beyond the boundaries of 
formal legal regulation, such offshore financial activities require a high degree of trust to 
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enable them to function successfully as socially constructed key nodes in global financial 
networks (Hudson, 1998). 
 
The liberalisation of capital markets led to an eightfold expansion of cross -border financial 
flows between 1990 and 2006 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008), of which around 20% are 
illegal. A vast quantity of money –estimated at USA$1.6 trillion annually - flows illegally into 
offshore accounts (Baker, 2005). Proceeds from bribery, drugs money laundering, human 
trafficking, counterfeit currencies and goods, smuggling, racketeering and illegal arms 
trading account for around 35% of such cross-border flows originating from developing and 
transitional economies. In contrast, the remaining 65% originate from the proceeds of illegal 
commercial activity, incorporating mispricing, abusive transfer pricing, and fake and 
fraudulent transactions, indicative of the pervasive character of illegality in the mainstream 
‘legal’ economy. However, national states and multilateral agencies have largely 
downplayed concerns about “dirty money” and money laundering,  except, revealingly and 
significantly, in relation to drugs and terrorism, which account for only a small proportion of 
illegal cross-border flows. This discursive selectivity reflects a tacit recognition of the 
intimate relationships between legal and illegal activities in the routine constitution of 
capitalist economies and of the pivotal role of OTHs as the spaces in which the financial 
flows between them takes place.  As Castells (2010, 172) puts it “[a]t the heart of the system 
is money laundering by the hundreds of billions (maybe trillions) of dollars. Complex 
financial schemes and international trade networks link up the criminal economy to the 
formal economy, thus deeply penetrating financial markets and constituting a critical, 
volatile element in a fragile global economy.” Castells thus emphasises the way in which the 
contemporary capitalist economy encourages and facilitates the systematic and large-scale 
laundering of “dirty money”. In stark contrast, such limited attention as is given to seeking 
to halt such flows is focussed upon “bribery of public officials and looting by despots and 
their cronies. … the prevailing corruption discourse remains largely focused on pointing 
fingers at petty officials and ruling kleptomaniacs” (Christensen, 2011, 181-184).  
In summary, since the criminal economy is a capitalist economy, the economic rationale for 
illegal activities depends upon the money that they realise becoming money capital invested 
in legitimate legal activities in the formal economy – and this crucially depends upon 
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successful money laundering operations. At the same time, however, the economic 
sustainability of the mainstream depends both upon the widespread deployment of illegal 
activities and upon continuous and substantial inflows of money from the illegal to the legal 
economy. The legal and illegal thus co-exist in a symbiotic relationship. As a result of the 
explosion of global financial flows OTHs have become major sites of activity in global 
financial markets and have become closely entangled with servicing illegal economic 
activities, precisely because of the lack of transparency that surrounds transactions carried 
out in and through them, either because of banking secrecy laws or through de facto judicial 
arrangements and banking practices. The secretive legal instruments used for legal (if 
morally dubious) tax avoidance are also used for illegal tax evasion linked to a wide range of 
other criminal activities. OTHs encourage and enable large scale corruption by providing an 
operational base used by legal and financial professionals, and their clients, to exploit the 
limits to legislation and gaps within and between national systems of tax regulation.  The 
bulk of money laundering operates via investments in securities and transfers of funds in 
global financial markets. Hidden behind a cloak of legal regulations, the legislative gaps are 
significant - while capital flows have become globally hypermobile, regulatory systems 
remain largely based on national territories, allowing ’dirty‘ money to be laundered through 
complex multi-jurisdictional ladders operating through the global banking system in which 
OTHs are key locations.  This has systemic implications. Since criminal capital is involved in 
high-risk activities in markets in which the speed, volatility and volume of electronic market 
transactions has increased greatly, it follows, and amplifies, speculative turbulence in 
financial markets. Thus, it has become an important source of destabilisation of 
international financial and capital markets, not least in contributing to the global financial 
crisis that began in 2008. The systemic threats that this poses to capitalist development are 
self-evident. 
Conclusions 
The symbiotic relationships between illegal and legal activities in ensuring the sustainability 
of the contemporary form of global capitalism are both deeply embedded and deeply 
contradictory. While symbiotic, these relationships are also contingent in the sense that 
their significance, while systemically structural, varies in the extent to which they emerge 
and become dominant in specific times and spaces.  From one point of view, the 
Chapter for Redclift and Springett edited collection 
 
19 
 
competitive success of particular companies and states and their economic sustainability is 
clearly crucially dependent upon their involvement in illegal production and/or trading 
activities, not least in money laundering and the cleansing of money that originated in the 
illegal economy so that it can be deployed as money capital in the legal economy. On the 
other hand, illegal activities within production systems may threaten the environmental, 
social and political sustainability of the spaces in which they occur while the burgeoning 
illegal practices in the financial sector, often linked to and enabling and facilitating money 
laundering activities through which illegally acquired money becomes legally legitimate 
money capital, threaten the systemic sustainability of globalised capitalism.  
The major global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 dramatically revealed that unfettered 
markets in fact threatened the sustainability of the capitalist economy and threatened to 
provoke an unparalleled depression in the capitalist economy and was only (so far at least) 
averted as a result of unprecedented and very class and territorially specific national state 
action and intervention. This included printing money on an unprecedented scale and the 
de facto nationalisation of banks and other major financial institutions by national 
governments, along with action by supra-national organisations that, at one level at least, 
espoused a neoliberal rhetoric that championed the virtues of unfettered markets as 
economic steering mechanisms.  
Crucially, however, such state interventions can only displace rather than abolish economic 
crisis tendencies. At the same time, a  global ecological crisis is immanent as a result of both 
illegal but predominantly legal activities, registered most visibly in the effects of human 
activity on the global climate and global warming – the only question is when, not if such a 
crisis erupts. The prospect of the coupling of economic and ecological crisis raises serious 
questions as to the future sustainability of capitalism as we have come to know it, and if not 
its replacement by something else, then at a minimum raises serious questions as to what 
sustainable forms of capitalism – ecologically, socially and politically as  well as economically 
- might be possible in future, and what they would look like. 
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